

PS 382: COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR
University of Mississippi, Fall 2011
Carrier 211, TuTh 9:30-10:45 AM

Instructor Information

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Office Hours: Th 1:00-3:00 PM

Course Overview

This course examines legislative behavior across democratic political systems, exploring how and why legislators make the political decisions that they do. We will discuss legislative politics in a wide array of settings, including the U.S. Congress, British House of Commons, Brazilian Congress, Russian Duma, Japanese Diet, and California state legislature. But note that the goal of this class is not simply to introduce students to a wide array of legislative institutions and traditions, but rather to identify general themes in legislative behavior and to explicate causal relationships between legislative institutions, behavior, and policy outcomes. Students who have completed this class should have a basic understanding of presidential and parliamentary systems, the roles that parties play in legislative politics, the dynamics of coalition government, how career motivations and electoral concerns affect legislators' behavior, and the ways in which parliaments delegate to, and, establish oversight over other political institutions.

Texts

The following required books are available for purchase at the University bookstore:

- John M. Carey. 2009. *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Seth. E. Masket. 2009. *No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- David Samuels. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

All other readings are available on Blackboard. I will make each week's readings available on Friday of the preceding week. You are expected to read all of the assigned material.

Requirements

Summary

Participation	10%
Reading Questions	10%
Exams (x2)	40%
Research Proposal	10%
Research Paper Draft	5%
Research Presentation	10%
Final Research Paper	15%

Participation

You are expected to attend every class and to participate in class activities and discussions. Participation is worth 10 percent of your final grade and will be based not just on how often you speak in class, but on my subjective evaluation of the content of your in-class contribution.

Reading Questions

Every student is required to regularly submit *thoughtful* one-paragraph questions about the assigned readings. Questions are due at 10:00PM the evening before the class the reading is assigned for, and will help to facilitate class discussion. Your question should seek to clarify some complicated or confusing aspect of the reading, examine argument(s) made by an author, and/or discuss relationships between the reading and larger debates in comparative legislative politics. Ideally, you should have an answer, or a set of possible answers, in mind when you write your question.

You must submit a question for 5 of the 20 class meetings for which I have assigned readings. Each submitted question is worth two percent of your overall grade, for a total of 10 percent. You may submit more than 5 reading questions (but no more than one per class meeting, and up to a maximum of 10), and I will count your 5 highest scores towards your grade.

Exams

Two in-class exams will each account for 20 percent of your total grade. Each exam will contain a mixture of multiple choice and short answer/essay questions. The exams are non-cumulative and each cover about half of the course material.

Research Project

You will work on a research project, on a topic within legislative politics of your choice, throughout the semester. This project has multiple components:

1. A 2–3 page **research proposal** that summarizes your research question, provides a short literature review, and is accompanied by a preliminary bibliography containing at least six sources. The proposal is worth ten percent of your total grade.
2. A **research paper** of no more than 15 pages. This paper should not simply provide an historical—or descriptive—account of some set of political events. Rather it should go beyond the "what and when" and should seek to explain why, and how, a particular legislative behavior or policy outcome occurred. A **rough draft** of this paper (worth five percent of your final grade) will be due at the beginning of November, while the final paper (worth 15 percent of your grade) will be due on the last day of class.
3. A short (5–7 minute) multimedia **research presentation** that details the key arguments and findings of your research project and explains your project to the class. You will give your presentations during the last three class meetings (we may use the scheduled final exam time for overflow, if necessary).

Class Policies

Make-Up Exams and Assignments

I will allow make-up exams and class presentations only in extreme circumstances and only by prior arrangement or given a valid medical excuse. I will not accept late reading questions, paper proposals, paper drafts, or final papers.

Grades and Appeals

I use a flat grade scale: A=94–100, A-=90–93, B+=87–89, B=84–86, B-=80–83, C+=77–79, C=70–77, D=60–69, F=59 or lower. Note that there is no C-. Therefore, if you are a political science major, this class will count towards your degree as long as you obtain at least 70 percent of the available points. Plus/minus grades are new to the University this year; see <http://www.olemiss.edu/info/grading.html> for information.

If you have a complaint about an exam or paper grade you must type a formal appeal describing the problem. Your appeal should clearly explain why you believe that your original work correctly answered the exam question or paper prompt and make a cogent argument for improving your grade. Attach a copy of the original exam or assignment to your appeal.

Electronic Devices

You may not use a cell phone, laptop, or other electronic device in class without first explicitly obtaining permission from me.

Academic Integrity & Plagiarism

I expect any work that you submit for this class to be your own original creation. While you are encouraged to build on existing work in your own writing, you *must* credit others whenever you incorporate their words, or ideas, in your work. Please make sure you understand

what plagiarism is, and what it is not. I will assume that you have, at least, viewed the University's tutorial on plagiarism and academic honesty: http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/instruction/resources/plagiarism_ac_honest/plagiarism_academic_honesty.html. The penalty for plagiarism is, at minimum, a failing grade on the relevant assignment. In all but the least serious of cases the penalty will be a failing grade in the class.

Course Schedule

8/23: Introduction

8/25: Why Study Legislatures?

- USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening
- Carey (2009), Ch. 1

8/30: Why Parties?

- Cox & McCubbins (2005), ch. 2
- Aldrich (1995), ch. 2
- Carey (2009), ch. 2

9/1: Parties and Lawmaking

- Cox & McCubbins (2005), ch. 3
- Krehbiel (1998), ch. 1–2
- Smith (2002)
- Hix, Noury & Roland (2007), ch. 6

9/6: Candidate Selection

- Norris (1997)
- Rahat & Hazan (2001)
- Wessels (1997)

9/8: Ambition and Career Paths

- Hibbing (1999)
- Samuels (2003), pp. 1–75

9/13: The Electoral Connection

- Mayhew (1974), ch. 1
- Carey & Shugart (1995)

9/15: Electoral Systems, Parties, and Representation

- Canon (2002)
- Moser (2001), ch. 2–3

9/20: Executive-Legislative Relations

- Shugart & Carey (1992), ch. 1–4
- Cheibub, Przeworski & Saiegh (2004)
- Ames (2001), ch. 6

9/22: Legislative Accountability

- Carey (2009), ch. 3–4

9/27: Review and Catch-Up—PAPER PROPOSAL DUE!**9/29: Exam 1****10/4: Party Unity and Discipline 1**

- Bowler, Farrell & Katz (1999)
- Kam (2009), ch. 2
- Ames (2001), ch. 7

10/6: Party Unity and Discipline 2

- Carey (2009), ch. 5–6
- Hix, Noury & Roland (2007), ch. 5

10/11: Forming Coalition Governments

- Laver & Shepsle (1996), ch. 1–4

10/13: Coalition Duration and Stability

- Laver & Schofield (1998), ch. 6
- Strom (1984)

10/18: The Efficient Secret 1

- Cox (1987), part 2

10/20: The Efficient Secret 2

- Cox (1987), part 3

10/25: Incentives and Inefficiency 1

- Samuels (2003), pp. 79–156

10/27: Incentives and Inefficiency 2

- Ames (2001), ch. 5 & 8

11/1: Delegation and Oversight—PAPER ROUGH DRAFT DUE!

- McCubbins & Schwartz (1984)
- Ramseyer & Rosenbluth (1993), ch. 1–2, 5–7

11/3: No Middle Ground 1

- Masket (2009), pp. 1–86

11/8: No Middle Ground 2

- Masket (2009), pp. 108–203

11/10: Review and Catch-Up**11/15: Exam 2****11/17: Student Presentations****11/22: Thanksgiving break, no class****11/24: Thanksgiving break, no class****11/29: Student Presentations****12/1: Student Presentations—FINAL PAPER DUE!****References**

- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ames, Barry. 2001. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell & Richard S. Katz. 1999. Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments. In *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press pp. 3–22.
- Canon, David T. 2002. Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures. In *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peeverill Squire & D. Roderick Kiewiet. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press pp. 149–177.
- Carey, John M. 2009. *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John M. & Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas.” *Electoral studies* 14(4):417–440.
URL: <http://cedar.olemiss.edu/courses/pol628/careyshugart95.pdf>
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Adam Przeworski & Sebastian M. Saiegh. 2004. “Government coalitions and legislative effectiveness under presidentialism and parliamentarism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 34:565–587.
- Cox, Gary W. 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- Hibbing, John R. 1999. “Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(2):149.
URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440308?origin=crossref>
- Hix, Simon, Abdul G. Noury & Gerard Roland. 2007. *Democratic Politics in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kam, Christopher J. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Laver, Michael & Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael & Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
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- Mayhew, David. 1974. *The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- McCubbins, M.D. & T. Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 165–179.
URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110792>
- Moser, Robert G. 2001. *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1997. *Passages to Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
URL: <http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/222957824.pdf>
- Rahat, G. & R. Y. Hazan. 2001. "Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework." *Party Politics* 7(3):297–322.
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- Ramseyer, J. Mark & Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1993. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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- Shugart, Matthew Soberg & John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Steven S. 2002. Positive Theories of Congressional Parties. In *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire & D. Roderick Kiewiet. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press pp. 224–244.
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- Wessels, Bernhard. 1997. Germany. In *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 76–97.